In this paper we use pre existing language support for type modifiers and object capabilities to enable a system for sound runtime verification of invariants. Our system guarantees that class invariants hold for all objects involved in execution. Invariants are specified simply as methods whose execution is statically guaranteed to be deterministic and not access any externally mutable state. We automatically call such invariant methods only when objects are created or the state they refer to may have been mutated. Our design restricts the range of expressible invariants but improves upon the usability and performance of our system compared to prior work. In addition, we soundly support mutation, dynamic dispatch, exceptions, and non determinism, while requiring only a modest amount of annotation.
Introduction
Object oriented programming languages provide great flexibility through subtyping and dynamic dispatch: they allow code to be adapted and specialised to behave differently in different contexts. However this flexibility hampers code reasoning, since object behaviour is usually nearly completely unrestricted. This is further complicated with the support OO languages typically have for exceptions, memory mutation, and I/O. Class invariants are an important concept when reasoning about software correctness. They can be presented as documentation, checked as part of static verification, or, as we do in this paper, monitored for violations using runtime verification. In our system, a class specifies its invariant by defining a boolean method called invariant. We say that an object's invariant holds when its invariant method would return true. We do this, like Dafny [44] , to minimise special syntactic and type-system treatment of invariants, making
In Spec# we had to add 10 different annotations, of 8 different kinds; some of which were quite involved. In comparison, our approach requires only 7 simple keywords, of 3 different kinds; however we needed to write a separate moveTo method, since we do not want to burden our language with extra constructs such as Spec#'s expose.
Summary
We have fully implemented our protocol in L42 23 , we used this implementation to implement and test an interactive GUI involving a class with an invariant. On a test case with 5 objects with an invariant, our protocol performed only 77 invariant checks, whereas the visible state semantic invariant protocols of D and Eiffel perform 53 and 14 million checks (respectively). See Section 7 for an explanation of these result. We also compared with Spec#, whose invariant protocol performs the same number of checks as ours, however the annotation burden was almost 4 times higher than ours.
In this paper we argue that our protocol is not only more succinct than the pack/unpack approach, but is also easier and safer to use. Moreover, our approach deals with more scenarios than most prior work: we allow sound catching of invariant failures and also carefully handle non deterministic operations like I/O. Section 2 explains the type modifier and object capability support we use for this work. Section 3 explains the details of our invariant protocol, and section 4 formalises a language enforcing this protocol. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, explain and motivate how our protocol can handle invariants over immutable and encapsulated data. Section 7 presents our GUI case study and compares it against visible state semantics and Spec#. Sections 8 and 9 provide related work and conclusions.
Appendix A provides a proof that our invariant protocol is sound. Appendices B and C provide further case studies and comparisons against Spec#, D and Eiffel.
Type Modifiers and Object Capabilities
Reasoning about imperative object oriented (OO) programs is a non trivial task, made particularly difficult by mutation, aliasing, dynamic dispatch, I/O, and exceptions. There are many ways to perform such reasoning, here we use the type system to restrict, but not prevent such behaviour in order to be able to soundly enforce invariants with runtime verification (RV).
Type Modifiers (TMs)
TMs, as used in this paper, are a type system feature that allows reasoning about aliasing and mutation. Recently a new design for them has emerged that radically improves their usability; three different research languages are being independently developed relying on this new design: the language of Gordon et. al. [38] , Pony [22, 23] , and L42 [68, 67, 43, 35] . These projects are quite large: several million lines of code are written in Gordon et. al.'s language and are used by a large private Microsoft project; Pony and L42 have large libraries and are active open source projects. In particular the TMs of these languages are used to provide automatic and correct parallelism [38, 22, 23, 67 ]. While we focus on the specific TMs provided by L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al., type modifiers are a well known language mechanism [75, 11, 61, 22, 35, 38] that allow statically reasoning about mutability and aliasing properties of objects. With slightly different names and semantics, the four most common modifiers for references to objects are:
Mutable (mut): the referenced object can be mutated, as in most imperative languages without modifiers. If all types are mut, there is no restriction on aliasing/mutation. Readonly (read): the referenced object cannot be mutated by such references, but there may be mutable aliases to such object, thus mutation can still be observed. Immutable (imm): the referenced object can never mutate. Like read references, one cannot mutate through an imm reference, however imm references also guarantee that the referenced object will not mutate through any other alias. Encapsulated (capsule): everything in the reachable object graph (ROG) of a capsule reference (including itself) is mutable only through that reference; however immutable references can be freely shared across capsule boundaries.
TMs are different to field or variable modifiers like Java's final: TMs apply to references, whereas final applies to fields themselves. Unlike a variable/field of a read type, a final variable/field cannot be reassigned, it always refers to the same object, however the variable/field can still be used to mutate the referenced object. On the other hand, an object cannot be mutated through a read reference, however a read variable can still be reassigned. 
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Sound Invariant Checking Using Type Modifiers and Object Capabilities.
Consider the following example usage of mut, imm, and read, where we can observe a change in rp caused by a mutation inside mp.
mut Point mp = new Point (1 , 2) ; mp . x = 3; // ok imm Point ip = new Point (1 , 2) ; //ip . x = 3; // type error read Point rp = mp ; // ok , read is a common supertype of imm / mut //rp . x = 3; // type error mp . x = 5; // ok , now we can observe rp . x == 5 ip = new Point (3 , 5) ; // ok , ip is not final
There are several possible interpretations of the semantics of type modifiers. Here we assume the full/deep meaning [79, 66] :
the objects in the ROG of an immutable object are immutable, a mutable field accessed from a read reference produces a read reference, no casting/promotion from read to mut is allowed.
There are many different existing techniques and type systems that handle the modifiers above [79, 21, 39, 38, 68] . The main progress in the last few years is with the flexibility of such type systems: where the programmer should use imm when representing immutable data and mut nearly everywhere else. The system will be able to transparently promote/recover [38, 22, 68 Here mc, cc, and ic are syntactically initialised with the same expression: new Circle(..). The new expression returns a mut, so mc is obviously ok. Moreover, the expression does not use any mut local variables, thus the flexible TM system allows the mut result to be promoted to capsule, thus cc is ok. Additionally, a capsule can be implicitly converted to imm, thus ic is also ok. We want to emphasise that this is not a special feature of new expressions: any expression of a mut type that uses no free mut variables declared outside can be implicitly promoted to capsule/imm. 5 This is the main improvement on the flexibility of TMs in recent literature [67, 68, 38, 22, 23] . Former work [16, 14, 40, 69, 2] , which eventually enabled the work of Gordon et. al., does not consider promotion and infers uniqueness/isolation/immutability only when starting from references that have been tracked with restrictive annotations along their whole lifetime. From a usability perspective, this improvement means that these TMs are opt-in: a programmer can write large sections of code mindlessly using mut types and be free to have rampant aliasing. Then, at a later stage, another programmer may still be able to encapsulate those data structures into an imm or capsule reference.
The capsule modifier (sometimes called isolated/iso) is possibly the one whose details differ the most in literature. Here we refer to the interpretation of [38] , that introduced the concept of recovery/promotion. This concept is the basis for L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al.'s type systems [38, 67, 68, 67, 22, 23] .
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The capsule/isolated fields of Gordon et. al. and Pony rely on destructive reads [38, 22] : in order to read them, a new value (such as null) will be assigned to them. In contrast, L42 [67, 68] does not require such destructive reads, thus capsule fields can be accessed many times, and their content can be seen from outside; but only in controlled ways. Both Gordon et. al. and Pony restrict how capsule local variables can be used by changing the type they are seen as, however both allow the local variable to be 'consumed', allowing them to be used as normal capsule/isolated expressions, at the cost of being unable to use the variable again. L42 however uses a simpler approach where all accesses to capsule local variables consume them: they are expressed using linear/affine types [13] , thus they can only be used once.
Exceptions
In most languages exceptions may be thrown at any point; combined with mutation this complicates reasoning about the state of programs after exceptions are caught: if an exception was thrown whilst mutating an object, what state is that object in? Does its invariant hold? The concept of strong exception safety (SES) [1, 43] simplifies reasoning: if a try-catch block caught an exception, the state visible before execution of the try block is unchanged, and the exception object does not expose any object that was being mutated. L42 already enforces SES for unchecked exceptions.
6 L42 enforces SES using TMs in the following way:
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Code inside a try block capturing unchecked exceptions is typed as if all mut variables declared outside of the block are read. Only imm objects may be thrown as unchecked exceptions.
This strategy does not restrict throwing exceptions, but only catching unchecked ones. SES allows us to soundly capture invariant failures as unchecked exceptions: the broken object is guaranteed to be garbage collectable when the exception is captured. For the purposes of soundly catching invariant failures, it would be sufficient to enforce SES only when capturing exceptions caused by such failures.
Object Capabilities (OCs)
OCs, which L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al.'s work have, are a widely used [54, 60, 42] programming style that allows associating resources with objects. When this style is respected, code that does not possess an alias to such an object cannot use its associated resource. Here, as in Gordon et. al.'s work, we use OCs to reason about determinism and I/O. To properly enforce this, the OC style needs to be respected while implementing the primitives of the standard library and when performing foreign function calls that could be non deterministic, such as operations that read from files or generate random numbers. Such operations would not be provided by static methods, but instead instance methods of classes whose instantiation is kept under control. For example, in Java, System.in is a capability object that provides access to the standard input resource, however, as it is globally accessible it completely prevents reasoning about determinism.
In contrast, if Java were to respect the object capability style, the main method could take a System parameter, as in main(mut System s) {.. s.in.read() ..}. Calling methods 6 This is needed to support safe parallelism. Pony takes a more drastic approach and does not support exceptions in the first place. We are not aware of how Gordon et. al. handles exceptions, however in order for it to have sound unobservable parallelism it must have some restrictions. 7 Transactions are another way of enforcing strong exception safety, but they require specialized and costly run time support. 8 A formal proof of why these restriction are sufficient is presented in the work of Lagorio [43] . on that System instance would be the only way to perform I/O; moreover, the only System instance would be the one created by the runtime system before calling main. This design has been explored by Joe-E [32] . OCs are typically not part of the type system nor do they require runtime checks or special support beyond that provided by a memory safe language. However, since L42 allows user code to perform foreign calls without going through a predefined standard library, its type system enforces the OC pattern over such calls:
Foreign methods (which have not been whitelisted as deterministic) and methods whose names start with #$ are capability methods. Constructors of classes declared as capability classes are also capability methods. Capability methods can only be called by other capability-methods or mut/capsule methods of capability classes. In L42 there is no main method, rather it has several main expressions; such expressions can also call capability methods, thus they can instantiate capability objects and pass them around to the rest of the program.
L42 expects capability methods to be used mostly internally by capability classes, whereas user code would call normal methods on already existing capability objects. For the purposes of invariant checking, we only care about the effects that methods could have on the running program and heap. As such, output methods (such as a print method) can be whitelisted as 'deterministic', provided they do not affect program execution, such as by non deterministically throwing I/O errors.
Purity
TMs and OCs together statically guarantee that any method with only read or imm parameters (including the receiver) is pure; we define pure as being deterministic and not mutating existing memory. Such methods are pure because:
the ROG of the parameters (including this) is only accessible as read (or imm), thus it cannot be mutated 9 , if a capability object is in the ROG of any of the arguments (including the receiver), then it can only be accessed as read, preventing calling any non deterministic (capability) methods, no other preexisting objects are accessible (as L42 does not have global variables).
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Our Invariant Protocol
Our invariant protocol guarantees that the whole ROG of any object involved in execution (formally, in a redex) is valid: if you can call methods on an object, calling invariant on it is guaranteed to return true in a finite number of steps. However, calls to invariant that are generated by our runtime monitoring (see below) can access the fields of a potentially invalid this. This is necessary to allow for the invariant method to do its job: namely distinguish between valid and invalid objects. However, as for any other method, calls to invariant written explicitly by users are guaranteed to have a valid receiver.
9 This is even true in the concurrent environments of Pony and Gordon, since they ensure that no other thread/actor has access to a mut/capsule alias of this. Thus, since such methods do not write to memory accessible by another thread, nor read memory that could be mutated by another thread, they are atomic. 10 If L42 did have static variables, getters and setters for them would be capability methods. Even allowing unrestricted access to imm static variables would prevent reasoning over determinism, due to the possibility of global variable updates; however constant/final globals of an imm type would not cause such problems.
For simplicity, in the following explanation and in our formalism we require receivers to always be specified explicitly, and require that the receivers of field accesses and updates are always this; that is, all fields are instance private. We also do not allow explicit constructor definitions, instead we assume constructors are of the standard form C (T 1 x 1 ,. ..,T n x n ) {this.f 1 =x 1 ;...;this.f n =x n ;}, where the fields of C are T 1 f 1 ;...; T n f n ;. This ensures that partially uninitialised (and likely invalid) objects are not passed around or used. These restrictions only apply to our formalism; our code examples and the L42 implementation soundly relax these, see below for a discussion.
Invariants
We require that all classes contain a read method Bool invariant() {..}, if no invariant method is present, a trivial one returning true will be assumed. As this method only takes a read parameter (the receiver), we can be sure that it is pure 11 , as discussed in Section 2. The bodies of invariant methods are limited in their usage of this: this can only be used to access imm and capsule fields. This restriction ensures that an invalid this cannot be passed around. We prevent accessing mut fields since their ROG could be changed by unrelated code (see Section 5) . Note that we do not require such fields to be final: when a field is updated, we simply check the invariant of the receiver of the update.
Capsule mutators
In order to allow complex mutations of objects with invariants we introduce the notion of capsule mutator. A capsule mutator can perform an arbitrarily complex mutation of the ROG of a capsule field. We use TMs to ensure that the object containing the capsule field is not usable whilst the fields ROG is mutated, and it's invariant is checked immediately afterwards.
Formally, capsule mutators are mut methods whose body accesses a capsule field mentioned in the invariant of the class containing the field. Capsule mutators must use this exactly once in their body, since fields are instance private, this will be to access the capsule field. Excluding the mut receiver, such methods cannot have any mut or read parameters, their return type must not be mut, and their throws clause must be empty.
12 . As capsule mutators use this only once, and have no read or mut parameters, this will not be accessible during execution. This is important, as it allows the invariant to be violated part way through the capsule mutator, but re established by the end. Preventing mut return types ensures that such methods cannot leak out a mutable alias to the capsule field, which could then be used to break the invariant. Note that these restrictions do not apply when the receiver of the field access is capsule, since we guarantee that the receiver is not in the ROG of any of its capsule fields, and hence it can never be seen afterwards.
Monitoring
The language runtime will insert automatic calls to invariant, if such a call returns false, an unchecked exception will be thrown. Such calls are inserted in the following points:
After a constructor call, on the newly created object. After a field update, on the receiver. After a capsule mutator method returns, on the receiver of the method 13 .
11 If the invariant were not pure, it would be nearly impossible to ensure that it would return true at any point. 12 To allow capsule mutators to leak checked exceptions, we would need check the invariant when such exceptions are leaked. However, this would make the runtime semantics of checked exceptions inconsistent with unchecked ones. 13 The invariant is not checked if the call was terminated via an an unchecked exception, since strong C V I T 2 0 1 6
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In Appendix A, we show that these checks, together with our aforementioned restrictions, are sufficient to ensure our guarantee that all objects involved in execution (except as part of an invariant check) are valid.
Relaxations
The above restrictions can be partially relaxed without breaking soundness, however this would not make the proof more interesting. In particular:
invariant methods can be allowed to call instance methods that in turn only use this to read imm or capsule, or call other such instance methods. With this relaxation, the semantics of invariant needs to be understood with the body of those methods inlined; thus the semantics of the inlined code needs to be logically reinterpreted in the context of invariant, where this may be invalid. In some sense, those inlined methods and field accesses can be thought of as macro expanded, and hence are not dynamically dispatched. Such inlining has been implemented in L42. We could allow all fields to be public, however capsule fields, mentioned in the invariant of their containing class, should not be accessible over a mut receiver other than this. Even without this relaxation, however, getters and setters could be used to simulate public fields. Unrestricted readonly access to capsule fields can be allowed by automatically generated getters of the form read method read C f() { return this.f; }. Such getters are already a fundamental part of the L42 language. Java style constructors could be allowed, provided that this is only used as the receiver of field initialisations. L42 does not provide such constructors, but one can always write a static factory method that behaves equivalently. Both L42, and our formal language (see Section 4) do not have traditional subclassing, rather all 'classes' are either interfaces (which only have abstract methods), or are final (which cannot be subtyped). In a language with traditional subclassing, invariant methods would implicitly start with a check that super.invariant() returns true. Note that invariant checks would not be performed at the end of super(..) constructor calls, but only at the end of new expressions, as happens in [30] .
Formal Language Model
In order to model our system, we need to formalise an imperative object oriented language with exceptions, object capabilities, and rich type system support for TMs and strong exception safety. Formal models of the runtime semantics of such languages are simple, but defining and proving, such a type system would require a paper of its own, and indeed many such papers exist in literature [67, 68, 38, 22, 43] . Thus we are going to assume that we already have an expressive and sound type system enforcing the properties we need, and instead focus on invariant checking. We clearly list in Appendix A the assumptions we make on such a type system, so that any language satisfying them, such as L42, can soundly support our invariant protocol. To keep our small step semantics as conventional as possible, we follow Pierce [64] and Featherweight Java [41] , and assume:
An implicit program/class table.
exception safety guarantees the object will be unreachable anyway. We use Σ σ to trivially extract the corresponding Σ from a σ. To encode object capabilities and I/O, we assume a special location c of class Cap. This location would refer to an object whose fields model things like the content of files. In order to simplify our proof, we assume that:
instances of Cap cannot be created with a new expression, all methods in the Cap class must require a mut receiver, and will mutate its ROG, Cap can only have mut fields, and Cap's invariant method is defined to return true. For simplicity, we do not formalise actual exception objects, rather we have errors, which correspond to expressions which are currently 'throwing' an exception; in this way there is no value associated with the error. Our L42 implementation instead models exceptions as throwing an imm value, formalising exceptions in this way would not cause any interesting variation of our proof.
Grammar
The detailed grammar is defined in Figure 1 . Most of our expressions are standard. Monitor expressions are of the form M(l;e 1 ;e 2 ), they are run time expressions and thus are not present in method bodies, rather they are generated by our reduction rules inside the main expression. Here, l refers to the object being monitored, e 1 is the expression which is being monitored, and e 2 denotes the evaluation of l.invariant(). If, at any point in execution, e 2 is false, then l's invariant failed to hold; such a monitor expression corresponds to the throwing of an unchecked exception.
In addition, our reduction rules will annotate try expressions with the original state of memory. This is used to model the guarantee of strong exception safety, that is, the annotated memory will not be mutated by executing the body of the try.
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f inside C.m, and f inside C.invariant then e = M(l;e;l.invariant()) otherwise e = e (monitor exit)
Figure 2 Reduction rules
Well Formedness Criteria
We additionally restrict the grammar with the following well formedness criteria: invariant methods and capsule mutators satisfy the restrictions in Section 3. 
Reduction rules
Our reduction rules are defined in Figure 2 . They are pretty standard, except for our handling of monitor expressions. We define the relation inside as follows:
Monitor expressions are added after all field updates, new expressions, and calls to capsule mutators. Monitor expressions are only a proof device, they need not be implemented directly as presented. For example, in L42 we implement them by statically injecting calls to invariant at the end of setters, factory methods and capsule mutators; this works as L42 does not have primitive expression forms for field updates and constructors, rather they are uniformly represented as method calls. Our ctxv rule evaluates monitor expressions, M(l;e 1 ;e 2 ), by first evaluating e 1 and then e 2 . If e 2 evaluates to true, then the monitor succeeded, and will yield the result of e 1 . If however e 2 evaluated to false, then the monitor failure will be caught by our try error rule, as will any other uncaught monitor failure in e 1 or e 2 .
Statement of Soundness
We define a deterministic reduction to mean that exactly one reduction is possible: σ 0 |e 0 ⇒ σ 1 |e 1 iff {σ 1 |e 1 } = {σ|e, where σ 0 |e 0 → σ|e} An object is valid iff calling its invariant method would deterministically produce true in a finite number of steps, i.e. it does not evaluate to false, fail to terminate, or produce an error. We also require evaluating invariant to preserve existing memory (σ), however new objects (σ ) can be created and freely mutated.
valid(σ, l) iff σ|l.invariant()⇒ + σ, σ |true. To allow the invariant method to be called on an invalid object, and access fields on such object, we define the set of trusted execution steps as the the call to invariant itself, and any field accesses inside its evaluation. Note that this only applies to single small step reductions, and not the entire evaluation of invariant.
Finally, we define what it means to soundly enforce our invariant protocol: every object referenced by any untrusted redex is valid.
Invariants Over Immutable State
In this section we consider validation over fields of imm types. In the next section we detail our technique for capsule fields.
In the following code Person has a single immutable (non final) field name: 
.); }} }
Such checks will be generated/injected, and not directly written by the programmer. If we were to relax (as in Rust), or even eliminate (as in Java), the support for TMs or OCs, the enforcement of our invariant protocol for the Person class would become harder, or even impossible.
Unrestricted use of non determinism
Allowing the invariant method to (indirectly) perform a non deterministic operation, such Despite the code for Person.invariant intuitively looking correct and deterministic, the above call to it is not. Obviously this breaks any reasoning and would make our protocol unsound. In particular, note how in the presence of dynamic class loading, we have no way of knowing what the type of name could be. Since our system allows non determinism only through capability objects, and restricts their creation, the above example would be prevented.
Allowing Internal Mutation Through Back Doors
Suppose we relax our rules by allowing interior mutability as in Rust and Javari, where sneaky mutation of the ROG of an 'immutable' object is allowed. Those back doors are usually motivated by performance reasons, however in [38] they briefly discuss how a few trusted language primitives can be used to perform caching and other needed optimisations, without the need for back doors.
Our example shows that such back doors can be used to break determinism of invariant methods, by allowing the invariant to store and read information about previous calls. In the following example we use MagicCounter as a back door to remotely break the invariant of person without any interaction with the person object itself: 
Strong Exception Safety
The ability to catch and recover from invariant failures is extremely useful as it allows programs to take corrective action. Since we represent invariant failures by throwing unchecked exceptions, programs can recover from them with a conventional try-catch. Due to the guarantees of strong exception safety, any object that has been mutated during a try block is now unreachable (as happens in alias burying [13] ). In addition, since unchecked exceptions are immutable, they can not contain a read reference to any object (such as the this reference seen by invariant methods). These two properties ensure that an object whose invariant fails will be unreachable after the invariant failure has been captured. If instead we were to not enforce strong exception safety, an invalid object could be made reachable:
mut Person bob = new Person ( " bob " ); // Catch and ignore invariant failure : try { bob . name ( " " ); } catch ( Error t ) { } // ill typed in L42 assert bob . invariant (); // bob is invalid ! As you can see, recovering from an invariant failure in this way is unsound and would break our protocol.
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Invariants over encapsulated state 
.);}} // injected check }
To handle this class we just inject calls to invariant at the end of the constructor and the addItem method. This is safe since the items field is declared capsule. Relaxing our system to allow a mut modifier for the items field and the corresponding constructor parameter breaks the code: the cargo we received in the constructor may already be compromised: mut Items items = ...; mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList ( items ); // l is valid items . addItem ( new HeavyItem ()); // l is now invalid ! As you can see it would be possible for external code with no knowledge of the ShippingList to mutate its items.
14 Our restrictions on capsule mutators ensure that capsule fields are essentially an exclusive mutable reference. Removing these restrictions would break our invariant protocol. If we were to allow x.items to be seen as mut, where x is not this, then even if the ShippingList
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has full control at initialisation time, such control may be lost later, and code unaware of the ShippingList could break it: mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList ( new Items ()); // l is ok mut Items evilAlias = l . items // here l loses control evilAlias . addItem ( new HeavyItem ()); // now l is invalid ! If we allowed a mut return type the following would be accepted: mut method mut Items expose ( C c ) { return c . foo ( this . items );} Depending on dynamic dispatch, c.foo() may just be the identity function, thus we would get in the same situation as the former example.
Allowing this to be used more than once can also cause problems:
mut method imm Void multiThis ( C c ) { read Foo f = c . foo ( this ); this . items . add ( new HeavyItem ()); f . hi (); } // Can ' this ' be observed here ?
If the former code were accepted, this may be reachable from f, thus f.hi() may observe an invalid object.
In order to ensure that a second reference to this is not reachable through the parameters, we only accept imm and capsule parameters. If we were however to accept a read parameter, as in the example below, we would be in the same situation as before, where f may contain a reference to this: mut method imm Void addHeavy ( read Foo f ) { this . items . add ( new HeavyItem ()) f . hi () } // Can ' this ' be observed here ? ... mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList (); read Foo f = new Foo ( l ); l . addHeavy ( f ); // We pass another reference to 'l ' through f
GUI Case study
Here we show that we are able to verify classes with circular mutable object graphs, that interact with the real world using I/O. Our case study involves a GUI with containers (SafeMovables) and Buttons; the SafeMovable class has an invariant to ensure that its children are completely contained within it and do not overlap. MoveAction ( mut Box outer ) { this . outer = outer ; } mut method Void process ( Event event ) { this . outer . l += 1; } } .. // main expression ; # $ is a capability method making a Gui object Gui .# $ (). display ( new SafeMovable (..));
As you can see, Boxes encapsulate the state of the SafeMovables that can change over time: left, top, and children. Also note how the ROG of Box is circular: since the MoveActions inside Buttons need a reference to the containing Box in order to move it. Even though the children of SafeMovables are fully encapsulated, we can still easily dispatch events to them using dispatch. Once a Button receives an Event with a matching ID, it will call its Action's process method.
Our example shows that the restrictions of TMs and OCs are flexible enough to encode interactive GUI programs, where widgets may circularly reference other widgets. In order to perform this case study we had to first implement a simple GUI Library in L42. This library uses object capabilities to draw the widgets on screen, as well as fetch and dispatch the events. Importantly, neither our application, nor the underlying GUI library require back doors into either our type modifier or capability system to function, demonstrating the practical usability of our restrictions.
The Invariant
SafeMovable is the only class in our GUI that has an invariant, our system automatically checks it in two places: the end of its constructor and the end of its dispatch method (is a capsule mutator). There are no other checks inserted since we never do a field update on a SafeMovable. The code for the invariant is just a couple of simple nested loops: Here SafeMovable.overlap is a static method that simply checks that the bounds of the widgets don't overlap. The call to this.inside(w1) similarly checks that the widget is not outside the bounds of this; this instance method call is allowed as inside only uses this to access its fields.
Our Experiment
As shown in the figure to the left, counting both SafeMovables and Buttons, our main method creates 21 widgets: a top level (green) SafeMovable without buttons, containing 4 (red, blue, and black) SafeMovables with 4 (gray) buttons each. When a button is pressed it moves the containing SafeMovable a small amount in the corresponding direction. This set up is not overly complicated, the maximum nesting level of Widgets is 5. Our main method automatically presses each of the 16 buttons once. In L42, using the approach of this paper, this resulted in 77 calls to SafeMovable's invariant.
Comparison With Visible State Semantics
As an experiment, we set our implementation to generate invariant checks following the visible state semantics approaches of D and Eiffel [3, 24] , where the invariant of the receiver is instead checked at the start and end of every public (in D) and qualified 16 (in Eiffel) method calls. In our SafeMovable class, all methods are public, and all calls are qualified, thus this difference is irrelevant. Neither protocol performs invariant checks on field accesses or updates, however due to the 'uniform access principle', Eiffel allows fields to directly implement methods, allowing the width and height fields to directly implement Widgets width and height methods. On the other hand in D, one would have to write getter methods, which would invoke invariant checks. When we ran our test case following the D approach, the invariant method was called 52, 734, 053 times, whereas the Eiffel approach 'only' called it 14, 816, 207 times;in comparison our invariant protocol only performed 77 calls. The number of checks is exponential in the depth of the GUI: the invariant of a SafeMovable will call the width, height, left, and top methods of its children, which may themselves be SafeMovables, and hence such calls may invoke further invariant checks. Note that width and height are simply getters for fields, whereas the other two are non trivial methods.
Spec# Comparison
We also encoded our example in Spec# 17 , which like L42, statically verifies aliasing/ownership properties, as well as the admissibility of invariants. The backend of the L42 GUI library is written in Java, we did not port it to Spec#, rather we just simulate the backend, and don't actually display a GUI in Spec#.
We ran our code through the Spec# verifier (powered by Boogie [4] ), which only gave us 2 warnings 18 : that the invariant of SafeMovable was not known to hold at the end of its constructor and dispatch method. Like our system however, Spec# checks the invariant at those two points at runtime. Thus the code is equivalently verified in both Spec# and L42; in particular it performed exactly the same number (77) of runtime invariant checks.
19
We found it quite difficult to encode the GUI in Spec#, due to its unintuitive and rigid ownership discipline. In particular we needed to use many more annotations, which were larger and had greater variety. In the following table we summarise the annotation burden, for the program that defines and displays the SafeMovables and our GUI; as well as the library which defines Buttons, Widget, and event handling. To encode the GUI example in L42, the only annotations we needed were the 3 type modifiers: mut, read, and capsule. Our Spec# code requires things such as, purity, immutability, ownership, method pre/post conditions and method modification annotations. In addition, it requires the use of 4 different ownership functions including explicit ownership assignments. In total we used 18 different kinds of annotations in Spec#. Together these annotations can get quite long, such as the following precondition on SafeMovable's constructor:
requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(children), children); The Spec# code also required us to deviate from the style of code we showed in our simplified version: we could not write a usable children method in Widget that returns a list of children, instead we had to write children_count() and children(int i) methods; we also needed to create a trivial class with a [Pure] constructor (since Object's one is not marked as such). In contrast, the only strange thing we had to in L42 was creating Boxes by using an additional variable in a nested scope. This is needed to delineate scopes for promotions. Based on these results, we believe our system is significantly simpler and easier to use.
The Box Pattern
Our design, using an inner Box object, is a common pattern in static verification: where one encapsulates all relevant mutating state into an encapsulated sub object which is not exposed to users.
Both our L42 and Spec# code required us to use the box pattern for our SafeMovable, due to the circular object graph caused by the Actions of Buttons needing to change their enclosing SafeMovable's position.
The Transform Pattern
Suppose we want to scale a Widget, we could add mut setters for width, height, left, and top in the Widget interface. However, if we also wish to scale its children we have a problem, since Widget.children returns a read Widgets, which does not allow mutation. [49] are unsuitable since they introduce back doors which are not easily verifiable as being used properly. Many approaches just try to preserve purity (as for example [63] ), but here we also need aliasing control. Ownership [20, 79, 25] is another popular form of aliasing control that can be used as a building block for static verification [57, 7] . Capsule/isolated local variables are affine in that they can be used only once, however this linearity is a property of variables, not expressions or fields. Linear/affine types extend this idea further, however they usually do not consider the ROGs of such types, or work in an OO setting [56, 29] .
Object Capabilities
In literature, OCs are used to provide a wide range of guarantees, and many variations are present. Object capabilities [55] , in conjunction with type modifiers, are able to enforce purity of code in a modular way, without requiring the use of monads. L42 and Gordon use OCs simply to reason about I/O and non determinism. This approach is best exemplified by Joe-E [32] , which is a self contained and minimalistic language using OCs over a subset of Java in order to reason about determinism. However, in order for Joe-E to be a subset of Java, they leverage on a simplified model of immutability: immutable classes must be final with only final fields that refer to immutable classes. In Joe-E, every method that only takes instances of immutable classes is pure. Thus their model would not allow the verification of purity for invariant methods of mutable objects. In contrast our model has a more fine grained representation of mutability: it is reference based instead of class based. In our work, every method taking only read or imm references is pure, regardless of their class type.
Class invariant protocols
Class invariants are a fundamental part of the design by contract methodology. Invariant protocols differ wildly and can be unsound or complicated, particular due to re entrancy and aliasing [45, 26, 53] .
While invariant protocols all seem to check and assume the invariant of an object after its construction, they handle invariants differently across object lifetimes; popular sound approaches include:
The invariants of objects in a steady state are known to hold: that is when execution is not inside any of the objects public methods [36] . Invariants need to be constantly maintained between calls to public methods [77] . The invariant of the receiver before a public method call and at the end of every public method body needs to be ensured. The invariant of the receiver at the beginning of a public method body and after a public method call can be assumed [17, 26] . Some approaches ensure the invariant of the receiver of the calling method, rather than the called method [58] . JML [34] relaxes these requirements for helper methods, whose semantic is the same as if they were inlined. The same as above, but only for the bodies of 'selectively exported' (i.e. non instance private) methods, and only for 'qualified' (i.e. not this) calls [53] . The invariant of an object is assumed only when a contract requires the object be 'packed'. It is checked after an explicit 'pack' operation, and objects can later be 'unpacked' [5] . Or, as in this work, the invariant of any object which could be involved in execution is assumed to hold. It is checked after every modification of the object or its encapsulated ROG. These different protocols can be deceivingly similar, and some approaches like JML suggest verifying a simpler approach (that method calls preserve the invariant of the receiver) but assume a stronger one (the invariant of every object, except this, holds).
Runtime Verification Tools
Many languages and tools support some form of runtime invariant checking (e.g. Eiffel [52] , D [3] , and JML [17] ). By looking to a survey by Voigt et al. [76] and the extensive MOP project [50] , it seems that most runtime verification tools (RV) empower users to implement the kind of monitoring they see fit for their specific problem at hand. This means that users are responsible for deciding, designing, and encoding both the logical properties and the instrumentation criteria [50] . In the context of class invariants, this means the user defines the invariant protocol and the soundness of such protocol is not checked by the tool.
In practice, this means that the logic, instrumentation, and implementation end up connected: a specific instrumentation strategy is only good to test certain logic properties in certain applications. No guarantee is given that the implemented instrumentation strategy is able to support the required logic in the monitored application. Some of these tools are designed to support class invariants: for example InvTS [37] lets you write Python conditions that are verified on a set of Python objects, but the programmer needs to be able to predict which objects are in need of being checked and to use a simpler domain specific language to target them. Hence if a programmer makes a mistake while using this domain specific C V I T 2 0 1 6
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language, invariant checking will not be triggered. Some tools are intentionally unsound and just perform invariant checking following some heuristic that is expected to catch most failures: such as jmlrac [17] and Microsoft Code Contracts [28] .
Many works attempt to move out of the 'RV tool' philosophy to ensure RV monitors work as expected, as for example the study of contracts as refinements of types [31] . However, such work is only interested in pre and post conditions, not class invariants.
Our invariant protocol is much stronger then visible state semantics, and keeps the invariant under tight control. Gopinathan et. al.'s. [36] approach keeps a similar level of control: relying on powerful aspect oriented support, they detect any field update in the whole ROG of any object, and check all the invariants that such update may have violated. We agree with their criticism of visible state semantics, where methods still have to assume that any object may be broken; in such case calling any public method would trigger an error, but while the object is just passed around (and for example stored in collections), the broken state will not be detected; Gopinathan et. al.
says "there are many instances where o's invariant is violated by the programmer inadvertently changing the state of p when o is in a steady state. Typically, o and p are objects exposed by the API, and the programmer (who is the user of the API), unaware of the dependency between o and p, calls a method of p in such a way that o's invariant is violated. The fact that the violation occurred is detected much later, when a method of o is called again, and it is difficult to determine exactly where such violations occur."
However, their approach addresses neither exceptions nor non determinism caused by I/O, so their work is unsound if those aspects are taken into consideration.
Their approach is very computationally intensive, but we think it is powerful enough that it could even be used to roll back the very field update that caused the invariant to fail, making the object valid again. We considered a roll back approach for our work, however rolling back a single field update is likely to be completely unexpected, rather we should roll back more meaningful operations, similarly to what happens with transactional memory, and so is likely to be very hard to support efficiently. Using TMs to enforce strong exception safety is a much simpler alternative, providing the same level of safety, albeit being more restrictive (namely that if the operation did succeed it is still effectively rolled back).
Chaperones and impersonators [71] lifts the techniques of gradual typing [73, 74, 78 ] to work on general purpose predicates, where values can be wrapped to ensure an invariant holds. This technique is very powerful and can be used to enforce pre and post conditions by wrapping function arguments and return values. This technique however does not monitor the effects of aliasing, as such they may notice if a contract has broken, but not when or why. In addition, due to the difficulty of performing static analysis in weakly typed languages, they need to inject runtime checking code around every user facing operation. Aspect oriented systems like Jose [30] , similarly wrap invariant checks around method bodies.
Security and Scalability
Our approach allows verifying an object's invariant independently of the actual invariants of other objects. This is in contrast with the main strategy of static verification: to verify a method, the system assumes the contracts of other methods, and the content of those contracts is the starting point for their proof. Thus, static verification proceeds like a mathematical proof: a program is valid if it is all correct, but a single error invalidates all claims. This makes it hard to perform verification on large programs, or when independently maintained third party libraries are involved. This is less problematic with a type system, since its properties are more coarse grained, simpler and easier to check. Static verification has more flexible and fine grained annotations and often relies on a fragile theorem prover as
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a backend.
To soundly verify code embedded in an untrusted environment, as in gradual typing [74, 78] , it is possible to consider a verified core and a runtime verified boundary. You can see our approach as an extremely modularized version of such system: every class is its own verified core, and the rest of the code could have Byzantine behaviour. Our formal proofs show that every class that compiles/type checks is soundly handled by our protocol, independently of the code that uses such class or any other surrounding code.
Our approach works both in a library setting and with the open world assumption. Consider for example the work of Parkinson [62]: in his short paper he verified a property of the Subject/Observer pattern. However, the proof relies on (any override of) the Subject.register(Observer) method respecting its contract. Such assumption is unrealistic in a real world system with dynamic class loading, and could trivially be broken by a user defined EvilSubject.
Static Verification
Spec# [8] is a language built on top of C#, it adds various annotations such as method contracts and class invariants. It primarily follows the Boogie methodology [59] where (implicit) annotations are used to specify and modify the owner of objects and whether their invariants are required to hold. Invariants can be ownership based [5] , where an invariant only depends on objects it owns; or visibility based [6, 46] , where an invariant may depend on objects it doesn't own, provided that the class of such objects know about this dependence. Unlike our approach, Spec# does not restrict the aliases that may exist for an object, rather it restricts object mutation: an object cannot be modified if the invariant of its owner is required to hold. This is more flexible than our approach as it also allows only part of an object's ROG to be owned/encapsulated. However as we showed in Section 7, it can become much more difficult to work with and requires significant annotation since merely having an alias to an object is insufficient to modify it or call methods on it. Spec# also works with existing .NET libraries by annotating them with contracts, however such annotations are not verified. Spec#, like us, does perform runtime checks for invariants and throws unchecked exceptions on failure. However Spec# does not allow soundly recovering from an invariant failure, since catching unchecked exceptions in Spec# is intentionally unsound. [48] Another system is AutoProof [65], a static verifier for Eiffel that also follows the Boogie methodology, but extends it with semantic collaboration where objects keep track of their invariants' dependencies using ghost state. Dafny [44] is a new language where all code is statically verified, it supports invariants by injecting pre and post conditions following visible state semantics; however it requires objects to be newly allocated (or cloned) before another object's invariant may depend on it. Dafny is also generally highly restrictive with its rules for mutation, and object construction, it also does not provide any means of performing non deterministic I/O.
Specification languages
Using a specification language based on the mathematical metalanguage and different from the program language's semantics may seem attractive, since it can express uncomputable concepts, has no mutation or non determinism, and is often easier to formally reason about.
However, a study [18] discovered that developers expect specification languages to follow the semantics of the underling language, including short circuit semantics and arithmetic exceptions; thus for example 1/0 || 2>1 should not hold, while 2>1 || 1/0 should, thanks to short circuiting. This study was influential enough to convince JML to change its interpretation of logical expressions accordingly [19] . Dafny [44] uses a hybrid approach: it has mostly the same language for both specification and execution. Specification ('ghost') C V I T 2 0 1 6
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contexts can use uncomputable constructs such as universal quantification over infinite sets. Whereas runtime contexts allow mutation, object allocation and print statements. The semantics of shared constructs (such as short circuiting logic operators) is the same in both contexts.
Most runtime verification systems, such as ours, use a metacircular approach: specifications are simply code in the underlying language. Since specifications are checked at runtime, they are unable to verify uncomputable contracts. Ensuring determinism in a non functional language is challenging. Spec# recognizes the need for purity/determinism when method calls are allowed in contracts [9] 'There are three main current approaches: a) forbid the use of functions in specifications, b) allow only provably pure functions, or c) allow programmers free use of functions. The first approach is not scalable, the second overly restrictive and the third unsound.'.
They recognize that many tools unsoundly use option (c), such as AsmL [10] . Spec# aims to follow (b) but only considers non determinism caused by memory mutation, and allows other non deterministic operations, such as I/O and random number generation. For example, the following method verifies:
[ Pure ] bool uncertain () { return new Random (). Next () % 2 == 0;} And so assert uncertain() == uncertain(); also verifies, but randomly fails with an exception at runtime. As you can see failing to handle non determinism jeopardises reasoning.
A simpler and more restrictive solution to these problems is to prevent 'pure' functions from reading or writing to any non final fields, or calling any impure functions. This is the approach used by [33] , one advantage of their approach is that invariants (which must be 'pure') can read from a chain of final fields, even when they are contained in otherwise mutable objects. However their approach completely prevents invariants from mutating newly allocated objects, thus greatly restricting how computations can be performed.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Our approach follows the principles of offensive programming [70] , where no attempt to fix or recover an invalid object is performed and failures (unchecked exceptions) are raised close to their cause: at the end of constructors creating invalid objects and immediately after field updates and instance methods that invalidate their receivers. Our work builds on a specific form of TMs and OCs, whose popularity is growing, and we expect future languages to support some variation of these. Crucially, any language already designed with such TMs and OCs can also support our invariant protocol with minimal added complexity.
We demonstrated the applicability and simplicity of our approach with a GUI example. Our invariant protocol performs several orders of magnitude less checks than visible state semantics, and requires much less annotation than Spec#, (the system with the most comparable goals). In Section 4 we formalised our invariant protocol and in Appendix A we prove it sound. To stay parametric over the various existing type systems which provably enforce the properties we require for our proof (and much more), we do not formalise any specific type system.
One interesting avenue for future work would be to use invariants to encode pre and post conditions, as done by [33] : where pre and post conditions are encoded as the invariants of the parameter and return types (respectively). Without good syntax sugar, such an approach could be quite verbose, however it would ensure that a methods precondition holds during the entire execution of a method, and not just the beginning. In addition this could be more efficient than traditional runtime checking when the same argument is used in the invocations of methods with the same pre condition, as happens often in practice for recursive methods: where many parameters are simply parsed unmodified in recursive calls.
The language we presented here restricts the forms of invariant and capsule mutator methods; such strong restrictions allow for sound and efficient injection of invariant checks. These restrictions do not get in the way of writing invariants over immutable data, but the box pattern is required for verifying complex mutable data structures. We believe this pattern, although verbose, is simple and understandable. While it may be possible for a more complex and fragile type system to reduce the need for the pattern whilst still ensuring our desired semantics, we prioritize simplicity and generality.
In order to obtain safety, simplicity, and efficiency we traded some expressive power: the invariant method can only refer to immutable and encapsulated state. This means that while we can easily verify that a doubly linked list of immutable elements is correctly linked up, we can not do the same for a doubly linked lists of mutable elements. Our approach does not prevent correctly implementing such data structures, but the invariant method would be unable to access the list's nodes, since they would contain mut references to shared objects. In order to verify such data structures we could add a special kind of field which cannot be (transitively) accessed by invariants; such fields could freely refer to any object. We are however unsure if such complexity would be justified.
For an implementation of our work to be sound, catching exceptions like stack overflows or out of memory cannot be allowed in invariant methods, since they are not deterministically thrown. Currently L42 never allows catching them, however we could also write a (native) capability method (which can't be used inside an invariant) that enables catching them. Another option worth exploring would be to make such exceptions deterministic, perhaps by giving invariants fixed stack and heap sizes.
Other directions that could be investigated to improve our work include the addition of syntax sugar to ease the burden of the box and the transform patterns; type modifier inference, and support for flexible ownership types.
A Proof and Axioms
Axiomatic Type Properties
As previously discussed, instead of providing a concrete set of type rules, we provide a set of properties that the type system needs to respect. To express these properties, we first need some auxiliary definitions. The encapsulated ROG of l 0 is composed of all the objects in the ROG of its immutable and capsule fields:
l ∈ erog(σ, l 0 ) iff ∃f, Σ σ (l 0 ).f ∈ {imm _, capsule _} and l ∈ rog(σ, σ(l 0 ).f ) An object is mutatable in a σ and e if there is an occurrence of l in e, that when seen as imm makes the expression ill typed:
: T does not hold for any T .
Here we assume the usual Progress and Subject Reduction Base. Note that Subject Reduction Base only ensures properties about type checking, not invariant checking.
Assumption 1 (Progress). if Σ σ0 ; ∅ e 0 : T 0 , and e 0 is not form l or error, then σ 0 |e 0 → σ 1 |e 1 .
Assumption 2 (Subject Reduction Base
If the result of a field access is mut, the receiver is also mut; field updates are only allowed on mut receivers: Assumption 3 (Mut Field).
(1) if Σ; Γ e.f : mut _ then Σ; Γ e : mut _ and (2) if Σ; Γ e 0 .f = e 1 : T then Σ; Γ e 0 : mut _.
An object is not part of the ROG of its immutable or capsule fields 22 :
In a well typed σ and e, if mutatable l 2 is reachable through the erog of l 1 , and l 1 is reachable through the erog of l 0 , then all the paths connecting l 0 and l 2 pass trough l 1 ; thus if we were to remove l 1 from the object graph, l 0 would no longer reach l 2 :
Capsule Tree and Head Not Circular together imply that capsule fields section the object graph into a tree of nested 'balloons', where nodes are mutable encapsulated objects and edges are given by reachability between those objects in the original memory: if l 2 is in the encapsulated ROG of l 1 , and l 2 is mutatable and reachable through l 1 , then l 2 must be reachable by a capsule field. Thanks to Head Not Circular and l 1 ∈ erog(σ, l 0 ) we can derive that l 0 / ∈ erog(σ, l 1 ). The execution of an expression with no mut free variables is deterministic and does not mutate pre existing memory (and thus does not not perform I/O by mutating the pre existing c):
Assumption 6 (Determinism). if ∅; Γ e : T , ∀x (Γ(x) = mut _), and σ|e → + σ |e then σ|e ⇒ + σ, _|e , where e = e[x 1 = l 1 ,..., x n = l n ] and Σ σ ; ∅ e : T
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For each try-catch, execution preserves the memory needed to continue the execution in case of an error (the memory visible outside of the try). Note that our last well formedness rule requires update and mcall to introduce monitor expressions only over locations that are not preserved by try blocks. This can be achieved, since monitors are introduced around mutation operations (and new expression), and Strong Exception Safety ensures no mutation happens on preserved memory.
Assumption 7 (Strong Exception Safety
Proof of Soundness
It is hard to prove Soundness directly, so we first define a stronger property, called Stronger Soundness, and show that it is preserved during reductions by means of conventional Progress and Subject Reduction (Progress is one of our assumptions, while Subject Reduction relies heavily upon Subject Reduction Base). That is:
Progress ∧ Subject Reduction ⇒ Stronger Soundness, and Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness.
Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness
Stronger Soundness depends on wellEncapsulated, monitored and OK : wellEncapsulated(σ, e, l 0 ) iff ∀l ∈ erog(σ, l 0 ), not mutatable(l, σ, e). The main idea is that an object is well encapsulated if its encapsulated state cannot be modified by e.
An object is monitored if execution is currently inside of a monitor for that object, and the monitored expression e 1 does not contain l as a proper subexpression:
monitored(e, l) iff e = E v [M(l;e 1 ;e 2 )] and either e 1 = l, or l is not inside e 1 .
A monitored object is associated with an expression that can not observe it, but may reference its internal representation directly. In this way, we can safely modify its representation before checking its invariant.
The idea is that at the start the object will be valid and e 1 will reference l; but during reduction, l will be used to modify the object; only after that moment, the object may become invalid. Define OK (σ, e):
∀l ∈ dom(σ) either 1. garbage(l, σ, e), 2. valid(σ, l) and wellEncapsulated(σ, e, l), or 3. monitored(e, l). Finally, the system is in an OK state if all objects in memory, are either not (transitively) reachable from the expression (thus can be garbage collected), valid and encapsulated, or currently monitored. Starting from only the capability object, any well typed expression e 0 can be reduced in an arbitrary number of steps, and OK will always hold.
Theorem 3. Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness
Proof. By Stronger Soundness, each l in the current redex must be OK : 1. If l is garbage, it cannot be in the current redex, a contradiction.
If valid(σ, l)
, then l is valid, so thanks to Determinism no invalid object could be observed.
Otherwise, if monitored(e, l) then either:
we are executing inside of e 1 , thus the current redex is inside of a sub expression of the monitor that does not contain l, a contradiction. or we are executing inside e 2 : by our reduction rules, all monitor expressions start with e 2 = l.invariant(), thus the first execution step of e 2 is trusted. Further execution steps are also trusted, since by well formedness the body of invariant methods only use this (now replaced with l) to read fields. In any of the possible cases above, Soundness holds for l, and so it holds for all redexes.
Subject Reduction
Define fieldGuarded(σ, e):
and l is contained exactly once in E .
That is, all mut capsule field accesses are individually guarded by monitors. Note how we use C in x : mut C to guess the type of the accessed field, and that we use the full context E, instead of the evaluation context E v , to refer to field accesses everywhere in the expression e. Proof. This proof proceeds by induction in the usual manner.
Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction
Base case: At the start of execution, memory only contains c: since c is defined to always be valid, and has only mut fields, it is trivially wellEncapsulated, thus OK (c → Cap, e).
Induction: By Progress, we always have another evaluation step to take, by Subject Reduction such a step will preserve OK , and so by induction, OK holds after any number of steps.
Note how for the proof garbage collectability is important: when the invariant() method evaluates to false, execution can continue only if the offending object is classified as garbage.
Exposer Instrumentation
We first introduce a lemma derived from our well formedness criteria and the type system: Lemma 1 (Exposer Instrumentation). If σ 0 |e 0 → σ 1 |e 1 and fieldGuarded(σ 0 , e 0 ) then fieldGuarded(σ 1 , e 1 ).
Proof. The only rule that can introduce a new field access is mcall. In that case, Exposer Instrumentation holds by well formedness (all field accesses in methods are of the form this.f), since mcall inserts a monitor while invoking capsule mutator methods, and not field accesses themselves. If however the method is not a mut method but still accesses a capsule field, by Mut Field such a field access expression cannot be typed as mut and so no monitor is needed.
Note that monitor exit is fine because monitors are removed only when e 1 is a value.
Proof of Subject Reduction
Any reduction step can be obtained by exactly one application of the ctxv rule and one other rule. Thus the proof can simply proceed by cases on the other applied rule. By Subject Reduction Base and Exposer Instrumentation, Σ σ1 ; ∅ e 1 : T 1 and fieldGuarded(σ 1 , e 1 ). So we just need to proceed by cases on the reduction rule applied to verify that OK (σ 1 , e 1 ) holds: By update e = M(l;l;l).invariant()), thus monitored(e, l). Every l 1 such that l ∈ rog(σ, l 1 ) will verify the same case as the former step:
If it was garbage, clearly it still is. 
. Thus l must be monitored and hence it is OK .
Otherwise, l is still OK Suppose some other l 0 was wellEncapsulated and valid:
If l was in the rog of l 0 , by Capsule Tree, if l was in the rog of l, then v can only be reached from l 0 by passing through l, and so we could not have made l 0 non wellEncapsulated. In addition, since only things in the erog can be referenced by invariant, validity can not depend on l, and by Determinism it is still the case that l 0 is valid. And so we can't have effected l 0 being OK . Otherwise, this reduction step could not have affected l 0 , so l 0 is still OK . Nothing that was garbage could have been made reachable by this expression, since the only value we produced was v and it was reachable through l (and so could not have been garbage), thus l is still OK . As we don't change any monitors here, nothing that was monitored could have been made un-monitored, and so it is still OK .
(mcall, try enter and try ok):
These reduction steps do not modify memory, the memory locations reachable inside of main expression, or any monitor expressions. Therefore it cannot have any effect on the garbage, wellEncapsulated, valid (due to Determinism), or monitored properties of any memory locations, thus OK still holds.
Clearly the newly created object, l, is monitored. As for mcall, other objects and properties are not disturbed, and so OK still holds.
(monitor exit) σ|M(l;v;true) → σ|v:
As monitor expressions are not present in the original source code, it must have been introduced by update, mcall, or new. In each case the 3 rd expression started of as l.invariant(), and it has now (eventually) been reduced to true, thus by Determinism l is valid.
If the monitor was introduced by update, then v = l. We must have had that l was well encapsulated before update was executed (since it can't have been garbage and monitored, as update itself preserves this property and we haven't modified memory in anyway, we must still have that l is wellEncapsulated. As l is valid and wellEncapsulated, it is OK . If the monitor was introduced by mcall, then it was due to calling a capsule mutator method that mutated a field f .
A location that was garbage obviously still is, and so is also OK . No location that was valid could have been made invalid since this reduction rule performs no mutation of memory. If a location was wellEncapsulated before, the only way it could be non wellEncapsulated is if we somehow leaked a mut reference to something, but by our well-formedness rules, v cannot be typed as mut and so we can't have affected wellEncapsulated, hence such thing is still OK . The only location that could have been made un monitored is l itself. By our well formedness criteria, l was only used to modify l.f , and we have no parameters by which we could have made l.f non wellEncapsulated, since that would violate Capsule Tree. As nothing else in l was modified, and it must have been wellEncapsulated before the mcall, and so it still is. In addition since l is valid, it is OK . Otherwise the monitor was introduced by new. Since we require that capsule fields and imm fields are only initialised to capsule and imm expressions, by Capsule Tree, the resulting value, l, must be wellEncapsulated, since l is also valid we have that l is OK . 6. (try error) σ, σ 0 |try σ {error} catch {e} → σ|e:
By Strong Exception Safety, we know that σ 0 is garbage with respect to E v [e]. By our well formedness criteria, no location inside σ could have been monitored. Since we don't modify memory, everything in σ 0 is garbage and nothing inside σ was previously monitored, it is still clearly the case that everything in σ is OK .
B The Hamster Example in Spec#
In this section we describe exactly why we chose to annotate the example from Section 1 in the way we did. For brevity, we will assume the default accessibility is public, whilst in both Spec# and C#, it is actually private.
The Point Class
The typical way of writing a Point class in C# is as follows:
class Point { double x , y ; Point ( double x , double y ) { this . x = x ; this . y = y ; } } This works exactly as is in Spec#, however we have difficulty if we want to define equality of Points (see below).
The Hamster Class
The Hamster class in C# would simply be: Though this is legal in Spec#, it is practically useless. Spec# has no way of knowing whether pos is valid or consistent. If pos is not known to be valid, one will be unable to pass it to almost any method, since by default methods implicitly require their receivers and arguments to be valid (compare this with our invariant protocol, which guarantees that any reachable object is valid). If pos is not known to be consistent, one will be unable to mutate it, by updating one of its fields or by passing it as an argument (or receiver) to a non Pure method. Though we don't want pos to ever mutate, Spec# currently has no way of enforcing that an instance of a non immutable class is itself immutable 23 , as such we will simply refrain from mutating it.
To enable Spec# to reason about pos's validity, we will require that it be a peer of the enclosing Hamster; we can do this by annotating pos with [Peer] . Peers are objects that have the same owner, implying that whenever one is valid and/or consistent, the other one also is. This means that if we have a Hamster, we can use its pos, in the same ways as we could use the Hamster.
To simplify instantiation of Hamsters, their constructors will take unowned Points, Spec# will then automatically make such Point a peer. This is achieved by taking a [Captured] Point in the constructor (note how similar this is to taking a capsule Point). Note that unlike our system, this prevents multiple Hamsters from sharing the same Point, unless both Hamsters have the same owner, if Point were immutable, there would be no such restriction.
With the aforementioned modifications, the Hamster becomes: We don't want Point to be an immutable/value type, however if it were, the original unannotated version would not have any problems.
The Cage Class
The natural way to write this class in C#, if it had native support for class invariants like Spec#, would be: However for the above invariant to be admissible in Spec#, this.path and this.h must both be owned by this. In addition, the elements of this.path need to be owned by this, since this.path.Conatains will read them. Note that this.h.pos also needs 23 There is a the describes a simple solution to this problem: assign ownership of the object to a special predefined 'freezer' object, which never gives up mutation permission [47] , however this does not appear to have been implemented; this would provide similar flexibility to the TM system we use, which allows an initially mutable object to be promoted to immutable.
to be owned by this, however since pos is declared as [Peer] , if this owns this.h, it also owns this.h.pos. To fix the invariant, we will declare h, path, and the elements of path as reps (i.e. they are owned by the containing object). Finally, since Move modifies this.h, this.h needs to be made consistent, which requires that the owner (this) be made invalid; this can be achieved by using an expose(this) statement. expose(this){body} marks this as invalid, executes body, checks that the invariant of this holds, and then marks this valid again. As we did with the Hamster, we will simply take unowned h and path values, however we also need the elements of path to be unowned; since Spec# has no [ElementsCaptured] annotation, we will require path to be unowned, and its elements (denoted by Owner.ElementProxy(path)) to be owned by the same owner as path (which is null). The above constructor now fails to verify, since Boogie is unconvinced that its precondition actually holds when we initialise this.path. This is because the constructor for Object (the default base class if none is provided) is not marked as [Pure]; since it is (implicitly) called upon entry to Cage's constructor, Boogie has no idea as to what memory could've mutated, and so it doesn't know whether the precondition still holds. The solution is to explicitly call it, but at the end of the constructor: {this.h = h; this.path = path; base();}.
The above Cage code however does not work, since List operations, such as Contains and IndexOf, will call the virtual Object.Equals method to compute equality of Points. However Object.Equals implements reference equality, whereas we want value equality.
Defining Equality of Points
The obvious solution in C# is to just override Object.Equals accordingly, and let dynamic dispatch handle the rest: ). The latter annotation means it can only read fields of objects owned by the receiver of the method, so a [Pure] bool Equal(Point that) method can read the fields of this, but not the fields of that. Of course this would make the method unusable in Cage since the Points we are comparing equality against do not own each other. As such, the simplest solution is to pass the fields of the other point to the method:
[ Pure ] bool Equal ( double x , double y ) { return x == this . x && y == this . y ;} Sadly however this mean we can no longer use List's Contains and IndexOf methods, rather we have to expand out their code manually; making these changes takes us to the version we presented in Section 1.
C More Case Studies Family
The following test case was designed to produce a worst case in the number of invariant checks. We have a Family that (indirectly) contains a list of parents and children. The visible state semantics of both D and Eiffel perform additional invariant checks at the beginning of each call to processDay and addChild.
The results for Spec# are very interesting, since it performs less checks than L42. This is the case since processDay in Person just does a simple field update, which in Spec# do not invoke runtime invariant checks. Instead, Spec# tries to statically verify that the update cannot break the invariant; if it is unable to verify this, it requires that the update be wrapped in an expose block.
Spec# relies on the absence of arithmetic overflow, and performs runtime checks to ensure this 25 , as such the verifier concludes that the field increment in processDay cannot break the invariant. Spec# is able to avoid some invariant checks in this case by relying on all arithmetic operations performing runtime overflow checks; whereas integer arithmetic in L42 has the common wrap around semantics.
The annotations we had to add in the Spec# version 26 were similar to our previous examples, however since the fields of Person all have immutable classes/types, we only needed to add the invariant itself. The Family class was similar to our Cage example (see section 1), however in order to implement the addChild method we were forced to do a shallow clone of the new child (this also caused a couple of extra runtime invariant checks). Unlike L42 however, we did not need to create a box to hold the parents and children fields, instead we wrapped the body of the Family.processDay method in an expose (this) block. In total we needed 16 annotations, worth a total of 45 tokens, this is worse than the code following our approach that we showed above, which has 14 annotations and 14 tokens.
Spec# Papers
Their are many published papers about the pack/unpack methodology used by Spec#. To compare against their expressiveness we will consider the three mains ones that introduced their methodology and extensions:
Verification of Object-Oriented Programs with Invariants: [5] this paper introduces their methodology. In their examples section (pages 41-47), they show how their methodology would work in a class heirarchy with Reader and ArrayReader classes. The former represents something that reads characters, whereas the latter is a concrete implementation that reads from an owned array. They extend this further with a Lexer that owns a Reader, which it uses to read characters and parse them into tokens. They also show an example of a FileList class that owns an array of filenames, and a DirFileList class that extends it with a stronger invariant. All of these examples can be represented in L42 27 . The most interesting considerations are as follow: Their ArrayReader class has a relinquishReader method that 'unpacks' the ArrayReader and returns its owned array. The returned array can then be freely mutated and passed around by other code. However, afterwards the ArrayReader will be 'invalid', and so one can only call methods on it that do not require its invariant to hold. However, it may later be 'packed' again (after its invariant is checked). In contrast, our approach requires the invariant of all usable objects to hold. We can still relinquish the array, but at the cost of making the ArrayReader forever unreachable. This can be done by declaring relinquishReader as a capsule method, this works since our type modifier system guarantees that the receiver of such a method is not aliased, and hence cannot be used again. Note that Spec# itself cannot represent the relinquishReader method at all, since it does not provide explicit pack and unpack operations, rather its expose statement performs both an unpack and a pack, thus we cannot unpack an ArrayReader without repacking it in the same method. Their DirFileList example inherits from a FileList which has an invariant, and a final method, this is something their approach was specifically designed to handle. As L42 does not have traditional subclassing, we are unable to express this concept fully, but L42 does have code reuse via trait composition, in which case DirFileList can essentially copy and paste the methods from FileList, and they will automatically enforce the invariant of DirFileList. Object Invariants in Dynamic Contexts: [46] this paper shows how one can specify an invariant for a doubly linked list of ints (which is an immutable value type). Unlike our protocol however, it allows the invariant of Node to refer to sibling Nodes which are not owned/encapsulated by itself, but rather the enclosing List. Our protocol can verify such a linked list 28 (since its elements are immutable), however we have to specify the invariant inside the List class. We do not see this as a problem, as the Node type is only supposed to be used as part of a List, thus this restriction does not impact users of List. Friends Need a Bit More: Maintaining Invariants Over Shared State: [6] this paper shows how one can verify invariants over interacting objects, where neither owns/contains the other. They have multiple examples which utilise the 'subject/observer' pattern, where a 'subject' has some state that an 'observer' wants to keep track of. In their Subject/View example, Views are created with references to Subjects, and copies of their state. When a Subject's state is modified, it calls a method on its attached Views, notifying them of this update. The invariant is that a View's copy of its Subject's state is up to date. Their Master/Clock example is similar, a Clock contains a reference to a Master, and saves a copy of the Master's time. The Master has a Tick method that increases its time, but unlike the Subject/View example, the Clock is not notified. The invariant is that the Clock's time is never ahead of its Master's. Our protocol is unable to verify these interactions, because the interacting objects are not immutable or encapsulated by each other.
